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Abstract
We introduce a new class of values with transferable utility for level structures. In these hi-
erarchical structures, each level corresponds to a partition of the player set, which becomes
increasingly coarse from the trivial partition containing only singletons to the partition con-
taining only the grand coalition. The new values, called Harsanyi support levels solutions,
extend the Harsanyi solutions to level structures. As an important subset of these values,
we present the class of weighted Shapley support levels values as a further result. The val-
ues from this class extend the weighted Shapley values to level structures and contain the
Shapley levels value as a special case. Axiomatizations of the studied classes are provided.
Keywords Cooperative game · Level structure · (Weighted) Shapley (levels) value ·
Harsanyi set · Dividends
1 Introduction
Many institutions, companies, governments, and so on are organized in hierarchical struc-
tures. Typically, there is one unit at the top. In the following levels, each unit of the parent
level is divided into two or more subordinate units, which usually have a lower rank than the
higher ones. We can see a similar organizational structure in supply chains in some respects.
Effectiveness increases by sharing or pooling physical objects, resources, and information.
Queuing problems or electricity and other networks have a related background. A central
characteristic of all these forms of organization is that a cooperating unit can itself be an
actor to gain advantages of cooperation for the members of the unit. The question arises:
how should we share the benefits and allocate the costs?
To distribute the profits of cooperating coalitions, the application of a cooperative game
seems to be a natural approach. Winter (1989) defined a model for cooperative games
with a hierarchical structure, called level structure, which comprises a sequence of coalition
structures (the levels). At each level, the player set is partitioned into components where
each higher level is coarser than the previous one (see also Figure 1). Winter’s value
(Winter, 1989) for such a model, we call it Shapley levels value, extends the Owen value
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2(Owen, 1977), which is itself an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b). Thus,
this value satisfies adaptions of the symmetry axioms, satisfied by the Owen value, to level
structures.
To treat symmetric players differently when there are exogenous weights for the players,
Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values. Vidal-Puga (2012) established
a value for coalition structures with weights given by the size of the coalitions. With
a step by step top-down algorithm, Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) extended it to
level structures. Besner (2019) generalized this value to the class of the weighted Shapley
hierarchy levels values for arbitrary, exogenously given, weights. These values satisfy an
extension of the consistency property of the weighted Shapley values in Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989). Interestingly, the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values contain the Shapley levels
value but do not satisfy the null player axiom in general.
The weighted values for coalition structures in Levy and McLean (1989) and McLean
(1991) behave the other way round; they satisfy the null player property but do not cor-
respond to a consistency property in the above sense. Levy and McLean (1989) examine
several classes of weighted values for coalition structures which use the same weight system
as the weighted Shapley values: either for the players within a component or the compo-
nents themselves if the components act as players. The combined use of such a weight
system, both for players and components, is only mentioned. This latter class of extensions
of the weighted Shapley values and an extension of the class of random order values (Weber,
1988) to coalition structures is discussed in McLean (1991). Dragan (1992) called McLean’s
extensions of the weighted Shapley values McLean weighted coalition structure values. He
presented a formula for them related to that of the Owen value. For a fixed coalition
structure, these values coincide with a multiweighted Shapley value (Dragan, 1992).
Harsanyi (1959) introduced a new perspective on coalition functions. He used so-called
(Harsanyi) dividends, assigned to all feasible coalitions of a player set according to the
coalition function. Singletons receive the singleton worth as their dividend and the dividend
of each larger coalition S amounts to the worth of S minus the sum of all dividends of
the proper subcoalitions of S. The weighted Shapley values give the players as payoffs
a share of the dividends from the coalitions in which they are members. Two players’
shares of dividends from coalitions containing both players are always in the same ratio. In
comparison, the Harsanyi solutions (Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev, 1978), are more flexible. By
these values, two players can receive dividend shares from coalitions, containing both, in
various ratios for each coalition.
In this article, we introduce the Harsanyi support levels solutions. To the best of our
knowledge, these are the first values for level structures (LS-values) that extend the Harsanyi
solutions. We represent each value of the new class by a formula with dividends. The
coefficients in the formulas constitute a dividend sharing system, i. e., all coefficients are
non-negative and amount to one for each coalition. According to the definition of a Harsanyi
solution, the LS-values from this class correspond to a Harsanyi solution for a fixed level
structure. Therefore, they inherit all properties (adapted to level structures) of these values
for a fixed level structure.
Within the framework of level structures, we can also consider the components of a level
as players in so-called induced LS-games. Winter (1989) has shown that the Shapley levels
value satisfies the level game property. This property means that the payoff to a component
in an induced LS-game is equal to the sum of the payoffs to all players included in the
component. We show that if a value for level structures satisfies the level game property
and coincides for a fixed level structure with a Harsanyi solution, the value is a member
3of the class of the Harsanyi support levels solutions. A corollary, our main result, extends
an axiomatization of the class of the Harsanyi solutions by Vasil’ev (1981) and Derks et al.
(2000) to a characterization of the class of the Harsanyi support levels solutions.
Since the Harsanyi solutions are no random order values in general, we cannot adopt the
proof procedures for characterizations, e.g., in Winter (1989) or McLean (1991). We base
our proofs on dividends where two new lemmas are a significant help.
As a further result, we present the class of the weighted Shapley support levels values as
a proper subset of the class of the Harsanyi support levels solutions. The LS-values from
this class coincide with the McLean weighted coalition structure values on a level structure
with only three levels if we count the partition containing all singletons and the partition
containing only the grand coalition as levels. To offer characterizations for this class, we
adapt axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values in Nowak and Radzik (1995).
In the concluding section, it is briefly explained that the values presented in this article
can have an interesting solidarity characteristic: players who have formed a group support
the other group members even in situations where they are not active and do not expect any
direct reward for their support, as with the weighted Shapley Hierarchy levels values. In
this way, they differ fundamentally from solidarity-based solution concepts such as the equal
division value, the equal surplus division value (Driessen and Funaki, 1991), the egalitarian
Shapley values (Joosten, 1996) or the solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik, 1994) and the
Shapley-solidarity value (Calvo and Gutie´rrez, 2013).
The outline of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries, as
the main part, we introduce in Section 3 the Harsanyi support levels solutions with an ap-
propriate class axiomatization. In Section 4, we offer the weighted Shapley support levels
values as a further result. Examples in Section 5 illustrate the axioms of the characteri-
zations and a numerical example compares different values. Section 6 discusses the results
and concludes with a fundamental principle of group solidarity which is satisfied by our new
values. The Appendix (Section 7) provides all the proofs, related properties and lemmas,
and shows the logical independence of the axioms in our axiomatizations.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
Let R be the real numbers and R++ the set of all positive real numbers. We fix a countably
infinite set U, the universe of players, and denote by N the set of all non-empty and finite
subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v)
such that N ∈ N is a set of players and v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0, a coalition function where
2N is the power set of N . The subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions, v(S) is the worth
of coalition S, the set of all nonempty subsets of S is denoted by ΩS, and the set of all
TU-games with player set N is denoted by VN.
Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ VN and S ⊆ N . The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are
defined inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−
∑
R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ Ω
N, and
0, if S = ∅.
(1)
A TU-game (N, uT ) ∈ V
N, T ∈ ΩN, with uT (S) := 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) := 0 otherwise for
all S ⊆ N is called an unanimity game. It is well-known that any coalition function v on
4N has a unique representation
v =
∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )uT . (2)
(N, v) is called totally positive (Vasil’ev, 1975) if ∆v(T ) ≥ 0 for all T ⊆ N . Player
i ∈ N is called a null player in (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}; players
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called (mutually) dependent (Nowak and Radzik, 1995) in (N, v) if
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}, which is equivalent to
∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0, k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}. (3)
For all N ∈ N , a TU-value or solution φ is an operator that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ VN
a payoff vector φ(N, v) ∈ RN.
By W := {f : U→ R++}, wi := w(i) for all w ∈ W, i ∈ U, we define the collection of all
positive weight systems on U.
The following TU-values distribute the dividends of the coalitions proportionally to the
weights of the players included in this coalitions. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ VN, and each
w ∈ W , the (positively) weighted Shapley value Shw (Shapley, 1953a) is defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S∋i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (4)
As a special case of a weighted Shapley value, all weights are equal, the Shapley value
Sh (Shapley, 1953b) is defined by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S∋i
∆v(S)
|S|
for all i ∈ N.
For all coalitions that include the same two players, for the weighted Shapley values, the
dividend shares for these players are always in the same ratio. This need not be the case for
the following TU-values, using sharing systems, where the ratio of the dividend shares of
two players may also be different for two different coalitions containing both players. The
collection Λ of all sharing systems λ ∈ Λ on N is defined by
Λ :=
{
λ = (λS,i)S∈N , i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
λS,i = 1 and λS,i ≥ 0 for each S ∈ N and all i ∈ S
}
.
Hammer et al. (1977) and Vasil’ev (1978), independently of each other, defined a class of
TU-values. While Hammer et al. (1977) and, e. g., Derks et al. (2000) this class call
selectope, Vasil’ev (1978), Vasil’ev and van der Laan (2002), and, e. g., del Pozo et al.
(2011) refer to this class as Harsanyi set, abbreviated to H. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ VN,
and each sharing system λ ∈ Λ, we have a Harsanyi solution Hλ ∈ H, defined by
Hλi (N, v) :=
∑
T⊆N,T∋i
λT,i∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
By (4), it is immediate that the class of the weighted Shapley values is a proper subset of
the Harsanyi set.
2.2 LS-games
In the following, we also look at games where coalitions of players of a player set N ∈ N are
regarded as players. Also in TU-games players can be coalitions or representatives of them
respectively (see, e.g., Kalai and Samet (1987, Section 7)). Note, therefore, that for any
5player set N ∈ N , our universe U also contains all coalitions as players that the elements
from the player set N can form.
We denote the subset of all individuals of U by UI . An individual i ∈ UI is called a sub-
member of a player j ∈ U if i = j or j is a set which contains as elements “individuals”, or
“sets of individuals”, or “individuals and sets of individuals”, or “sets of sets of individuals”,
and so on, and i is an element of one of these possibly nested sets. A player set N ∈ N is
called sub-member-disjoint if no individual i ∈ UI is a sub-member of any two players
j, k ∈ N . To exclude from the outset inconsistencies in the worths or in the weighting
of coalitions and associated coalitions with the same sub-members, we will only consider
sub-member-disjoint player sets.1 The subset of all sub-member-disjoint player sets N ∈ N
is denoted by N dis.
For any N ∈ N dis, a coalition structure B on N is a partition of the player set N , i.e.,
a collection of nonempty, pairwise disjoint, and mutually exhaustive subsets of N . Each
B ∈ B is called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains a player
i ∈ N . A level structure (Winter, 1989) on N is a finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of
coalition structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, on N such that (see also Figure 1):
• B0 =
{
{i}: i ∈ N
}
,
• Bh+1 = {N}, and
• for each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br is a refinement of Br+1, i. e., Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N .
Br is called the rth level of B, B is the set of all components B ∈ Br of all levels Br ∈
B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and LN denotes the set of all level structures on the player set N .
For each B ∈ Bℓ, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ r ≤ h + 1, we denote by Br(B) the component of the rth
level containing B as a (not necessary proper) subset; Br(B) is called an ancestor of B; if
r = ℓ + 1, Br(B) is also called parent of B. We call all components with the same parent
B ∈ Br, 1 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, children of B and two different children of B are called siblings
in Br−1. We explicitly point out that a component, for different levels, can be its own child
or parent at the same time.
If we regard the components of the rth level, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as players and cancel all levels
below the rth level, we get the induced rth level structure Br :=
{
Br
0
, ...,Br
h+1−r}
∈
LB
r
from B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}. We give an illustrating example.
Example 2.1. LetN = {1, 2, 3} and B = {B0,B1,B2} be given by B0= {{1}, {2}, {3}}, B1=
{{1, 2}, {3}}, and B2 = {N}. We regard, e.g., the components of the first level as play-
ers. Then, the induced first level structure B1 = {B1
0
,B1
1
} from B is given by
B1
0
=
{{
{1, 2}
}
,
{
{3}
}}
, and B1
1
=
{{
{1, 2}, {3}
}}
.
For each N ∈ N dis, a TU-game (N, v) ∈ VN together with a level structure B ∈ LN is an
LS-game which is denoted by (N, v,B). We denote the set of all LS-games on N by VLN.
If we want to stress the property that a coalition T ∈ ΩN, T =
⋃
B⊆T,B∈BrB, is the union
of components of the rth level from B, we denote T by T r. Each such T r is an associated
coalition to a coalition of all players B ∈ Br, B ⊆ T r, in the induced rth level structure,
denoted by T r := {B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r} and vice versa. This means that a coalition and its
1E.g., let N :=
{
i, j, {i, j}
}
be a player set with three players where the third player is a coalition. In
a TU-game (N, v) ∈ VN, it does not matter if the worth v({i, j}) of the coalition {i, j} differ from the
worth v({{i, j}}) of the singleton {{i, j}}. For a game on level structures, we have an inconsistency in
the induced first LS-game (see the definition below) if the coalition {i, j} is there a player and we require
that the induced first LS-game is given by (5).
6associated coalition have the same sub-members. Thus, for each N ∈ N dis, each LS-game
(N, v,B) ∈ VLN, and each induced rth level structure Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have an associated
LS-game (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLB
r
, called induced rth LS-game2, with a coalition function vr
which is given by
vr(T r) := v(T r) for all T r∈ ΩB
r
. (5)
This means that a coalition in an induced LS-game that has the same sub-members as
a coalition from the original game also has the same worth as this associated coalition.
E.g., for the TU-game (N, v) ∈ VLN and B ∈ LN in example 2.1, we have v1
({
{1, 2}
})
=
v({1, 2}).
Also induced LS-games for induced LS-games and so on are possible. We will not go into
this in detail. Note that, for all N ∈ N dis, each TU-game (N, v) ∈ VN corresponds to an
LS-game (N, v,B0) ∈ VL
N with a trivial level structure B0 := {B
0,B1} and we would
like to point out that each LS-game (N, v,B) ∈ VLN corresponds to a game with coalition
structure (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Owen, 1977) if B := {B0,B1,B2}.
For all N ∈ N dis and all B ∈ LN, an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns to any
(N, v, B) ∈ VLN a payoff vector ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN.
By W dis ⊆ W , we define the collection of all positive weight systems on U where, for
each w ∈ W dis, we have wi = wj for all i, j ∈ U if i has the same sub-members as j. This
means that, e.g., for an LS-game (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, N ∈ N dis, we have that the weight wi of
a player i ∈ N is equal to the weight w{i} of the singleton {i} ∈ B
0 in the zeroth LS-game.
We also want a corresponding relationship for sharing systems. The collection Λdis ⊆ Λ
of all sharing systems λ ∈ Λdis on N dis is defined by
Λdis :=
{
λ = (λS,i)S∈N dis, i∈S
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈S
λS,i = 1 and λS,i ≥ 0 for each S ∈ N
dis and all i ∈ S
such that for all S ′ ∈ N dis with |S| = |S ′| and for each i ∈ S we have a j ∈ S ′
which has the same sub-members as i, we have λS,i = λS′,j
}
.
This means that if we have two coalitions with the same number of players, and for every
player in the first coalition we have a player in the second coalition with the same sub-
members, then the related players should also have the same weight for their respective
coalitions.
2.3 Axioms
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values ϕ which are mostly simple adaptions of
standard axioms for TU-values. All axioms below apply for all N ∈ N dis. We do not repeat
this phrase at the beginning of each axiom.
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, we have
∑
i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Efficiency requires that the sum of the payoffs should result in the total worth of the game.
The next property means that a player who contributes nothing to any coalition should
obtain no payoff.
Null player, N. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N such that i is a null player in (N, v),
we have ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
2In Owen (1977), a corresponding game, for the special case r = 1 and a level structure B = {B0,B1,B2},
is called a quotient game.
7Additivity, A. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Additivity states that a player’s payoff from the sum of two games is the sum of the player’s
payoff for the two games. By the following axiom, all players receive a non-negative payoff
if all coalitions have non-negative dividends.
Positivity, Pos (Vasil’ev, 1975). For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN such that (N, v) is totally posi-
tive, we have ϕi(N, v,B) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Strict monotonicity, SMon (Megiddo, 1974). For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and α ∈ R++, we
have ϕi(N, v + α · uN ,B) > ϕi(N, v,B) for all i ∈ N .
This property means that if the grand coalition improves its performance and the perfor-
mance of all other coalitions remains the same, all players should receive a higher payoff.
In our investigations, the next axiom plays an important role. It claims that the sum of
all players’ payoffs of a component coincides with this component’s payoff in an induced
LS-game where the component is regarded as a player.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1},
B∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have ∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(B
r, vr,Br). (6)
The following axiom says that if two siblings are symmetric in the induced rth LS-game,
the total payoff to all players of the first sibling is equal to the total payoff to all players of
the second sibling.
Symmetry between components, S3 (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN,B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1}, two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that Bk, Bℓ are symmetric in
(Br, vr) ∈ VB
r
, we have ∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B).
2.4 The Shapley levels value
The following formula is presented in Calvo et al. (1996, Eq. (1)).
For all N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and T ∈ ΩN, T ∋ i, define
KB,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrB,T (i), where K
r
B,T (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}|
(7)
be the reciprocal cardinality of the set that contains all children of the component of the
(r+1)th level containing player i, which contain at least one player from coalition T . Then,
the Shapley levels value4 (Winter, 1989) ShL is given by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T∋i
KB,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (8)
3This axiom is called coalitional symmetry in Winter (1989).
4The value is also known as level(s) structure value or Winter’s (Shapley type) value. Our designation is
used, e. g., in A´lvarez-Mozos et al. (2017).
8It is easy to see that ShL coincides with Sh if B = B0. Winter (1989) used the Owen value
(Owen, 1977) as a starting point for his LS-value. Therefore, Winter has extended the
efficiency, null player, symmetry and additivity axioms to axioms for level structures. He
splits symmetry into symmetry between components and an individual symmetry axiom. If
we define a level structure as above, i. e., the singletons are the elements of the lowest level,
Winter (1989, remark 1.6) pointed out that we can omit the individual symmetry axiom.
In this sense, we present Winter’s first axiomatization of the Shapley levels value5.
Theorem 2.2. (Winter, 1989) ShL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, N, S, and A.
It should be noted that there exist some further axiomatizations of the Shapley levels value
by Calvo et al. (1996), Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya (2007), Casajus (2010), Alvarez-
Mozos and Tejada (2011), and Besner (2019).
3 Harsanyi support levels solutions
With the Shapley levels value, symmetric siblings always get the same payoff. But some-
times there are compelling reasons, not included in the coalition function itself, to treat
symmetric siblings differently. We can have fixed, but for each coalition possibly different,
metrics for each player, representing, e. g., the effort, commitment, qualification, or power
of a player. Sometimes a player’s influence on other partners is stronger when another
player is not on the team. Or a player can only exert its influence if specific other players
have joined the coalition to support this player. The following values give the possibility
to deal with such situations.
Before we give a formal definition, we describe the payoff algorithm: Let N ∈
N dis, (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and λ ∈ Λdis. By (2), v can be expressed as
a linear combination of unanimity games. This means that we have a game vT for each
coalition T ∈ ΩN such that ∆vT (T ) = ∆v(T ), ∆vT (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N, S 6= T, and
v =
∑
T∈ΩN vT .
In the game vT , each component B
h of the hth level that contains at least one player
i ∈ T receives a share of ∆v(T ), proportional to its sharing weight λCh
T
, Bh , where C
h
T is
the coalition that contains all such components Bh as elements. Then the share of each
component Bh involved is distributed among all its children Bh−1 ⊆ Bh of the (h − 1)th
level, containing at least one player i ∈ T , proportional to their sharing weights λCh−1
T
, Bh−1 ,
where Ch−1T is the coalition that contains all such siblings Bh−1 as elements, and so on for
all levels. In the end, each player i ∈ T gets its share, “supported” by the sharing weights
of all its ancestors. To receive the total payoff of a player, these payoffs are finally added
up over all games vT where the player is not a null player.
Definition 3.1. For all N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, λ ∈ Λdis, and
T ∈ ΩN, T ∋ i, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, let
CrT (i) :=
{
B : B ∈ Br, B ⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅
}
(9)
be the set that contains all children of the component of the (r+1)th level containing player
i, which contain at least one player from coalition T . Define
5Winter (1989) introduced his value axiomatically and used this axiomatization as a definition.
9KλB,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
λCr
T
(i),Br(i). (10)
Then, for each λ ∈ Λdis, the Harsanyi support levels solution HλSL is given by
HλSLi (N, v, B) =
∑
T⊆N,T∋i
KλB,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (11)
The class of all Harsanyi support levels solutions is called Harsanyi support levels set
and is denoted by HSL.
Remark 3.2. We see that the Shapley levels value is a Harsanyi support levels solution with
a λ ∈ Λdis such that we have for each λCr
T
(i),Br(i) in (10) a K
r
B,T (i) in (7) with λCrT (i),Br(i) =
KrB,T (i).
Remark 3.3. For each N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, λ ∈ Λdis, and for all T ∈ ΩN, T ∋ i,
we have
∑
i∈T K
λ
B,T (i) = 1 and K
λ
B,T (i) ≥ 0. Therefore, for fixed N and B ∈ L
N, each
HλSL ∈ HSL on (N, v, B) coincides with a Hλ
′
∈ H, λ′ ∈ Λ, on (N, v) ∈ VN, where
λ′T,i = K
λ
B,T (i) for each T ∈ Ω
N and all i ∈ T and the level structure is disregarded.
To prepare our main result, we first assume that a sharing system λ ∈ Λdis is exogenously
given. We use a more or less technical property for unanimity games with some factor.
λ-balanced sharing between components in unanimity games (with some factor),
SCUλ. For each N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, λ ∈ Λdis, and for all α ∈ R and T ∈ ΩN,
two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Bk, Bℓ ∩ T 6= ∅, and C
r
T (Bk) :=
{
B : B ∈ Br, B ⊆
Br+1(Bk), B ∩ T 6= ∅
}
, we have
λCr
T
(Bk), Bℓ
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N,α · uT ,B) = λCr
T
(Bk), Bk
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N,α · uT ,B). (12)
This property says that for two siblings which contain both at least one player from T the
ratio of the payoff totals to all players of the two siblings in the unanimity game is equal to
the ratio of the sharing weights of both siblings. The sharing weights refer to the partition
that has as elements all siblings containing players from T .
The following proposition lists some axioms that are satisfied by a Harsanyi support
levels solution.
Proposition 3.4. Let λ ∈ Λdis. HλSL satisfies E, N, A, Pos, SCUλ, and LG.
We present a first axiomatization that replaces S in Theorem 2.2 by SCUλ.
Proposition 3.5. Let λ ∈ Λdis. HλSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, N, SCUλ,
and A.
It follows that the Harsanyi support levels solutions have an exceptional status among
extensions of Harsanyi solutions to LS-values.
Theorem 3.6. An LS-value ϕ coincides for fixed N and B ∈ LN with a Harsanyi solution
and satisfies LG if and only if ϕ ∈ HSL.
By Theorem 3.6 and the probably most famous characterization of the Harsanyi set in
Vasil’ev (1981) and Derks et al. (2000), the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 3.7. An LS-value ϕ satisfies E, N, Pos, A, and LG if and only if ϕ ∈ HSL.
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4 Further results
For applications, the class of weighted Shapley values is an important subset of the Harsanyi
set. Therefore, we would like to highlight the following subset of the Harsanyi support levels
set that extends the class of weighted Shapley values for level structures. Each possible
coalition is assigned a positive weight. In contrary to the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels
values, these values satisfy the null player property in general.
Again, we briefly describe how the dividends are distributed by the following LS-values.
Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, and w ∈ W
dis. The dividends of each coalition
T ∈ ΩN are divided as follows: Each component Bh of the hth level that contains at least
one player i ∈ T receives a share of ∆v(T ), proportional to its weight wBh . Then the share
of each component Bh involved is distributed among all its children Bh−1 ⊆ Bh containing
at least one player i ∈ T , proportional to their weights wBh−1 , and so on for all levels. In
the end, each player i ∈ T gets its share, “supported” by the weights of all its ancestors.
Definition 4.1. For all N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W dis, and for
all T ∈ ΩN, T ∋ i, define
KwB,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
wBr(i)∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
. (13)
Then, for each w ∈ W dis, the weighted Shapley support levels value ShwSL is given
by
ShwSLi (N, v, B) =
∑
T⊆N, T∋i
KwB,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (14)
The class of all weighted Shapley support levels values is denoted by WSSL.
Remark 4.2. If the weights for all coalitions are equal, (13) coincides with (7). Therefore,
the Shapley levels value is also a member of the class of the weighted Shapley support levels
values.
Remark 4.3. For all N ∈ N dis and level structures B ∈ LN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, a weighted
Shapley levels value ShwSL coincides with a Harsanyi support levels solution HλSL where we
have
λCr
T
(i),Br(i) =
wBr(i)∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB
for all T ∈ ΩN.
ShwSL coincides with Shw if B = B0 and, if B = {B
0,B1,B2}, the KwB,T (i) coincide with the
“λSi ” given in Dragan (1992, Sec. 2(e)). Therefore, in this case, the Sh
wSL coincide with
the McLean weighted coalition structure values (Levy and McLean, 1989; McLean, 1991;
Dragan, 1992).
Dependent players are always symmetric but not vice versa. Therefore, our next axiom can
be seen as a weighted weakening of S. The TU-version of this axiom comes from Nowak
and Radzik (1995, Axiom A4 (w-Mutual Dependence)).
w-weighted dependence between components, Depw. For all N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈
VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W dis, two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that Bk, Bℓ
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are dependent in (Br, vr) ∈ VB
r
, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBℓ
.
The meaning of this axiom is that if two siblings are dependent in the rth LS-game the
ratio of the sum of all players’ payoffs from the two siblings is equal to the ratio of the
weights of both siblings. It follows an extension of the mutual dependence axiom in Nowak
and Radzik (1995, Axiom 7).
Mutual dependence between components, MDep. For all N ∈ N dis, (N, v,B),
(N, v′,B) ∈ VLN,B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, two siblings Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that Bk, Bℓ
are dependent in (Br, vr) ∈ VB
r
and (Br, v′r) ∈ VB
r
, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v
′,B) =
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v
′,B).
This axiom considers games where two siblings are dependent in two induced rth LS-games.
Then this axiom states that the ratio of the payoff totals to all players of the siblings remains
invariant for such games if none of the sums is zero. The following proposition lists some
axioms that are satisfied by a weighted Shapley support levels value.
Proposition 4.4. Let w ∈ W dis. ShwSL satisfies E, N, A, LG, SMon, Depw, and
MDep.
The following proposition can be seen as an extension of characterizations of the weighted
Shapley values with exogenously given weights in Nowak and Radzik (1995).
Proposition 4.5. Let w ∈ W dis. ShwSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, N, Depw,
and A.
Our last theorem axiomatizes the class of weighted Shapley support levels values in general.
It is closely related to an axiomatization of the class of weighted Shapley values in Nowak
and Radzik (1995, Theorem 2.4, Remark 2.3).
Theorem 4.6. An LS-value ϕ satisfies E, N, SMon, A, and MDep if and only if ϕ ∈
WSSL.
5 Examples
Laura is the proprietor of an independent owner-managed and medium-sized software com-
pany. Her company is active as an IT specialist at two locations in Europe and one in
East Asia. She places her trust in innovative software engineering, and almost all orders
are carried out as agile projects. That is why each location has several agile teams, each
made up of all-rounders and highly specialized software developers, supported by local lean
management. Since projects have different scope and specialization requirements, the indi-
vidual teams do not only work together within their locations. Especially for larger projects,
the teams from Europe and East Asia complement each other by the different time zones
and create more releases in less time. Sometimes certain specialists from one team work
together with other (parts of) teams, and in small projects also only a few employees can
work together.
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Laura’s business has been going well for years. After deduction of all costs such as office
expenses, buildings, equipment acquisition and maintenance, software licenses, employees’
fixed salaries, marketing, taxes, management bonuses, and own profit share, a positive
share of total turnover, let’s say five percent, remains as a year’s profit. To motivate and
to build loyalty among her highly qualified IT staff, Laura wants to pay this amount to her
developers.
Laura is an enthusiastic cooperative game theorist. She defines a coalition function
in which each possible coalition of developers has a worth of five percent of the sum of
all revenues from all projects in which only members of that coalition were involved as
developers. To give all developers a “fair” share, Laura wants to include certain conditions
(axioms) in the payoff calculation. The worth of the grand coalition (that is exactly the
amount she wants to pay out), nothing more and nothing less, should be fully shared (E).
If a developer has been in training or has been ill all year and so has not taken part in a
single project, he/she should not receive any bonus (N). Under no circumstances should
any employee receive deductions from his or her salary. Hence, Pos must be satisfied, since
the game constructed here is totally positive. Laura wants to make sure that it doesn’t
matter to the developers whether it’s a monthly or annual billing as long as the staff doesn’t
change. Furthermore, the total amount paid to an individual developer should not depend
on whether a project is calculated for this year or next (A).
The development teams and the locations each have a high degree of self-responsibility,
for example, in the distribution of work or the recruitment of new employees. Laura wants
to take this into account by considering these units (components) to be largely independent
within this framework. Therefore, the payoff to the locations/teams in a modeled game
where the locations/teams are the players (induced level game) should be equal to the sum
of the payoffs to all players of the respective locations/teams (LG). Thus all axioms of
Corollary 3.7 must be satisfied, and Laura should use a value of the Harsanyi support levels
set for the payoff of the bonuses.
If Laura has key figures for the players/teams/locations and wants to check them or set
them first, SCUλ can be useful. For example, she could conclude that due to possible
higher costs of living, the weights for the European locations should be higher as for the
East Asian locations. However, if all three locations are involved in the same project, the
workload of the Asian location can increase. In this case, the weights for all three locations
could converge.
In Laura’s view, if the revenues for projects in which all her employees are involved
increase and the revenues from all other projects remain the same, then all employees should
have more in their pockets than before (SMon). Let two teams at the same location or
members of the same team always jointly work on projects (they are dependent in (N, v)).
Provided the total workforce does not change, Laura should choose a weighted Shapley
support levels value if she believes that the total payoff to both teams or both team members
should always be in the same ratio (MDep).
We give a numerical example to compare the distributions for different values in such
situations. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, N := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, and B = {B0,B1,B2,B3}, with
B1 := {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, {7}, {8, 9}}, B2 := {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7}, {8, 9}} (see Figure 1).
The coalition function v is given by the following dividends:
∆v({3}) = 1, ∆v({1, 2}) = 2, ∆v({1, 2, 3}) = 6,
∆v({5, 6, 7}) = 6, ∆v({1, 2, 5, 7}) = 2, ∆v({1, 2, 3, 8, 9}) = 5,
∆v({5, 6, 7, 8, 9}) = 6, ∆v({1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}) = 12,
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{1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {6} {7} {8} {9}
{1,2} {3,4} {5,6} {7} {8,9}
{1,2,3,4} {5,6,7} {8,9}
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}
Level: 3
2
1
0
Figure 1: Structure of the components in different levels
and all other coalitions have zero dividends in v.
For reasons of simplicity, we choose a weight system w ∈ W dis such that wS := |S| for
all S ∈ ΩN.
Furthermore, we denote by i# the number of all sub-members of a player i ∈ U. We use
a level sharing system λ ∈ Λdis, given by λB2,{1,2,3,4} := 0.4, λB2,{5,6,7} := 0.3, λB2,{8,9} := 0.3,
and, for all other S ∈ N dis, S 6= S ′ such that |S ′| = |B2| and for each i ∈ S ′ we have a
j ∈ B2 which has the same sub-members as i, we have
λS,i :=
i#∑
j∈S j
#
for all i ∈ S.
Therefore our numerical example mimics the situations in Laura’s company described above,
very simplified of course. It should be mentioned that here the weighted Shapley hierarchy
levels value ShwHL coincides with the LS-value presented in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga
(2011). We obtain Table 1. Note that player 4 is a null player, players 1 and 2 and players
8 and 9 respectively are dependent in (N, v), and components {5, 6} and {7} are dependent
in (B1, v1).
Table 1: Comparison of different values
Value Payoff to the players (rounded)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sh(N, v) 6 6 5.5 0 5.2 4.7 5.2 3.7 3.7
ShL(N, v,B) 4.625 4.625 7.25 0 3.75 3.25 7 4.75 4.75
ShwHL(N, v,B) 5.1524 5.1524 7.1690 1.3357 4.9847 4.6524 4.8190 3.3667 3.3667
ShwSL(N, v,B) 5.2381 5.2381 8.3333 0 5.1048 4.5333 4.8190 3.3667 3.3667
HλSL(N, v,B) 5.1048 5.1048 8.0667 0 4.9714 4.4 4.6857 3.8333 3.8333
The payoffs to the dependent players in (N, v) are equal, they have the same weights. The
dependent components in (B1, v1) have different weights. Thus, the payoffs to players 5 and
6 do not sum up to the payoff to player 7 for ShwHL, ShwSL or HλSL. We see that the
Shapley levels value prefers player 7 who has not joined a team with other players in the
first level. The payoffs to players 8 and 9 are higher by HλSL than by ShwHL or ShwSL since
HλSL takes into account the higher weight of the component {8, 9} within B2.
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6 Conclusion and discussion
The rapidly increasing volume of collected data and global networking make it possible
and necessary to share benefits between cooperating actors, often hierarchically structured.
According to the above examinations, for the distribution of the generated surpluses, the
presented new classes of LS-values provide an alternative to the Shapley levels value and
the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values. A close examination of the Shapley levels
value definition, given by (8), shows that in unanimity games, it is not advantageous for
the individual player to merge into components: all components which are siblings have
the same weight, even if a sibling is a singleton (see also the payoff to player 7 in Table 1).
The same need not apply to our new classes of LS-values and the weighted Shapley
hierarchy levels values: the greater the weight of a component, the higher the payoff in an
unanimity game. By the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values, null players also receive
a positive payoff if they contribute to the weight of the components involved (see Table 1).
On the contrary, the LS-values of the Harsanyi support levels set (and, thus, also the
weighted Shapley support levels values) always leave null players without benefits. Again,
it can be a great competitive advantage for the players to join forces. First, for those who
form a cooperating subgroup within the carrier of an unanimity game. And then for all
players who belong to coalitions with positive dividends within the whole coalition function.
Here, the players of a component can “support” each other in changing unanimity games,
even if they do not belong to the carrier. Nevertheless, null players do not receive any
payoff, even if they contribute to the total weight of components. However, we can also
interpret this in the spirit of cooperative game theory, which is in complete contrast to
non-cooperative game theory:
“As a null player in this game, I support you with all my power, even if I have
nothing of it at first. But I know that you as a null player in another game will
support me with all your power, even if you have nothing of it there.”
This “support” is a fundamental principle of solidarity in all societies. E.g., it forms the
business model of all associations and insurance companies. It can be disadvantageous,
to kick a null or dummy player out of a group where everyone can rely on each other!
This also means that an adaption to LS-games of the well-known null player out property
in Derks and Haller (1999) is violated, which stays that removing a null player from the
game does not change the payoff to the other players. An exception is the Shapley levels
value. Although it belongs to both the weighted Shapley support levels values and the
weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values, null players are not paid and cannot support the
corresponding group with their power (weight). Here the groups are powerless in the sense
that each group, regardless of size and importance, has the same weight. Despite the fact
that additivity is usually considered to be of little economic importance (see, e.g., Casajus
and Huettner (2014)), it takes on a new quality in the context of group formation, group
solidarity, and the Harsanyi support levels solutions.
7 Appendix
7.1 Logical independence
Remark 7.1. The axioms in Corollary 3.7 are logically independent.
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Proof. • E, N, Pos, A: The axiomatization must also be valid for B = B0. In this case,
the axioms in Corollary 3.7 coincide with the corresponding axioms for TU-values (and
an always satisfied axiom LG). It is well-known that these axioms for TU-values are
logically independent and, therefore, none of the corresponding axioms can be redun-
dant.
• LG: For all N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W dis, and for all
T ∈ ΩN, T ∋ i, define
AwB,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
wBr(i)∩T∑
B∈Bℓ:B⊆Bℓ+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
.
Then, the LS-values ShwAL, given by
ShwALi (N, v, B) =
∑
T⊆N,T∋i
AwB,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N,
satisfy obviously E, N, Pos, and A, but not LG in general6.
Remark 7.2. The axioms in Proposition 4.5 and Theorem 4.6 are logically independent:
Proof. The proof is omitted since it is analogous to the proof of Remark 7.1.
7.2 Additional axioms and lemmas, used in the proofs
The first axiom is defined on TU-games, coincides with SCUλ in the case of a trivial level
structure, and is used in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
λ-balanced sharing in unanimity games (with some factor), SUλTU . For all N ∈ N ,
(N, v) ∈ VN, α ∈ R, λ ∈ Λ, T ∈ ΩN, and i, j ∈ T , we have
λT, jφi(N,α · uT ) = λT, iφj(N,α · uT ).
The following axiom is a weakening of SCUλ and is also used in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Property (12) has to be satisfied only for singletons.
λ-balanced sharing between singletons in unanimity games (with some factor),
SSUλ. For each N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, λ ∈ Λdis, and for all α ∈ R and
T ∈ ΩN, i, j ∈ T such that j ∈ B1(i), and C0T ({i}) :=
{
B : B ∈ B0, B ⊆ B1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅
}
,
we have
λC0
T
({i}), {j}ϕi(N,α · uT ,B) = λC0
T
({i}), {i}ϕj(N,α · uT ,B).
6Let (N, uS , B) ∈ VL
N, w ∈ W dis such that the weights are given as in Table 2, N := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and
B = {B0,B1,B2,B3} with B1 := {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}}, B2 := {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5}}, and uS be the unanimity game
with carrier S := {1, 2, 3, 5}.
Table 2: Weights of the coalitions
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4}
wS 1 1 1 1 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 7
It follows, ShwAL{1,2,3,4}(B
2, v2,B2) = 7
12
6= 1
2
=
∑
i∈{1,2,3,4} Sh
wAL
i (N, v,B).
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Our first lemma states that each non-empty coalition S for each level is a subset of only one
coalition that is a union of components from this level which have a non-empty intersection
with S.
Lemma 7.3. Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, Br∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Each
S ∈ ΩN is a subset of exactly one coalition T r∈ ΩN, T r=
⋃
B⊆T r, B∈Br,
B∩S 6=∅
B. Thus, we can also
uniquely designate each S ∈ ΩN as ST r .
Proof. Each coalition T r∈ ΩN is a union of components B ∈ Br. Br is a partition, and so
each player i ∈ S, S ∈ ΩN, is contained in only one component B ∈ Br. Therefore, for each
coalition S ∈ ΩN there is exactly one coalition T r∈ ΩN which is a union of all components
B ∈ Br containing at least one player i ∈ S.
The second lemma shows that for each coalition T in an induced level structure the dividend
in the induced LS-game is equal to the sum of the dividends in the original game from all
coalitions S of the original level structure which are subsets of a coalition T associated to
T and have the property of the previous lemma with respect to coalition T .
Lemma 7.4. Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and
ST r be the coalitions from lemma 7.3 with associated coalition T
r. Then, we have in the rth
LS-game (Br, vr,Br) for each T r∈ ΩB
r
, associated to a T r∈ ΩN,
∆vr(T
r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r). (15)
Proof. Let t = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r}| the number of components B ∈ Br which are
subsets from a coalition T r ∈ ΩN with associated T r ∈ ΩB
r
. We use induction on the size
t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |Br|.
Initialization: Let t = 1. T r is a component B ∈ Br. We have
∆vr(T
r) =
(1)
vr(T r) =
(5)
v(T r) =
(1)
∑
S⊆T r
∆v(S) =
Lem.
7.3
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
Induction step: Assume that (15) holds for an arbitrary tˆ ≥ 1 (IH). Let now Tˆ r ∈ ΩB
r
with associated Tˆ r ∈ ΩN, tˆ = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Tˆ r}| and T r = Tˆ r ∪ Bˆ, Bˆ ∈ Br, Bˆ 6⊆ Tˆ r. We
have t = tˆ+ 1 and it follows
∆vr(T
r) =
(1)
∑
Qr⊆T r
∆vr(Q
r) =
(1)
(5)
v(T r)−
∑
Qr(T r
∆vr(Q
r)
=
(1)
(IH)
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
Qr(T r,
Qr⊆Br
∑
SQr⊆Qr
∆v(SQr)
=
Lem.
7.3
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
S(T r,
S 6=STr
∆v(S)
= ∆v(T
r) +
∑
STr(T
r
∆v(ST r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
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7.3 Proofs
7.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, λ ∈ Λdis, and KλB,T be the expressions
according to Def. 3.1.
• E,N,A,Pos: It is well-known that all Hλ∈ H, λ ∈ Λ, satisfy the mentioned axioms
for TU-values. Thus, the claim follows by Remark 3.3.
• LG: Let B ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. If r = 0, (6) trivially is satisfied because the zeroth
LS-game corresponds to the original LS-game.
Let now 1 ≤ r ≤ h. Obviously, by (9), we have for all S ⊆ N, S ∩ B 6= ∅,
∑
j∈B, j∈S
r−1∏
ℓ=0
λCℓ
S
(j),Bℓ(j) = 1. (16)
In the game (Br, vr,Br), we have for all T r ∈ ΩB
r
, T r ∋ B, associated T r, and an arbitrary
i ∈ B,
KλBr,T r(B) =
(9)
(10)
h∏
ℓ=r
λCℓ
Tr
,Bℓ(i). (17)
Let i ∈ B be fixed and ST r ∈ Ω
N the coalitions from Lemma 7.3 with related coalitions T r.
Note, if i ∈ ST r , we have B⊆ T
r. For all ST r , ST r ∋ i, r ≤ ℓ ≤ h, we have
λCℓ
STr
(i),Bℓ(i) =
(9)
Lem.7.3
λCℓ
Tr
(i),Bℓ(i). (18)
It applies, Bℓ(i) = Bℓ(j) for all j ∈ B and r ≤ ℓ ≤ h. For all ST r ∋ i, it follows,
∑
j∈B,
j∈STr
KλB,STr (j) =(10)
∑
j∈B,
j∈STr
h∏
ℓ=0
λCℓ
STr
(j),Bℓ(j) =
(18)
∑
j∈B,
j∈STr
r−1∏
ℓ=0
λCℓ
STr
(j),Bℓ(j)
h∏
ℓ=r
λCℓ
Tr
(i),Bℓ(i)
=
(16)
h∏
ℓ=r
λCℓ
Tr
(i),Bℓ(i) =
(17)
KλBr,T r(B). (19)
Finally, we get the following:∑
j∈B
HλSLj (N, v,B) =
(11)
∑
j∈B
∑
S⊆N,
S∋j
KλB,S(j)∆v(S) =
Lem.
7.3
∑
j∈B
∑
STr⊆N,
STr∋j
KλB,STr (j)∆v(ST r)
=
∑
STr⊆N
∑
j∈B,
j∈STr
KλB,STr (j)∆v(ST r) =(19)
∑
STr⊆N,
T r∋B
KλBr,T r(B)∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
7.3
∑
T r⊆Br, T r∋B
KλBr,T r(B)
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r)
=
Lem.
7.4
∑
T r⊆Br, T r∋B
KλBr,T r(B)∆vr(T
r) =
(11)
ShλSLB (B
r, vr,Br).
• SCUλ: Let α ∈ R, T ∈ ΩN, k, ℓ ∈ N, Br(ℓ) ⊆ Br+1(k), 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(k),Br(ℓ) ∩ T 6= ∅,
and CrT (B
r(k)) :=
{
B : B ∈ Br, B ⊆ Br+1 (Br(k)), B ∩ T 6= ∅
}
. If λCr
T
(Br(k)),Br(k) = 0 or
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λCr
T
(Br(k)),Br(ℓ) = 0, (12) is satisfied by (10) and (11). Otherwise, if r = 0, we have,
HλSLk (N,α · uT ,B)
λC0
T
({k}), {k}
=
(11)
KλB,T (k)
λC0
T
({k}), {k}
α =
(9)
(10)
KλB,T (ℓ)
λC0
T
({k}), {ℓ}
α =
HλSLℓ (N,α · uT ,B)
λC0
T
({k}), {ℓ}
.
Analogously, in the rth LS-game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have
HλSLBr(k)(B
r, (α · uT )
r,Br)
λCr
T
(Br(k)),Br(k)
=
Lem. 7.3
Lem. 7.4
HλSLBr(ℓ)(B
r, (α · uT )
r,Br)
λCr
T
(Br(k)),Br(ℓ)
and the claim follows by LG.
7.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, λ ∈ Λdis, S ∈ ΩN, and ϕ be an LS-
value that satisfies all axioms of Proposition 3.5. Due to Proposition 3.4, (2), and A, it is
sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
If B ∈ Br, B ∩ S = ∅, we have, by N,∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, vS,B) = 0 for all r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. (20)
We use induction on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h, for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h− r.
Initialization: Let m = 0 and so r = h. It follows for all i ∈ S with
∏h
ℓ=r λCℓS(i),Bℓ(i) > 0,
a such i always exists, and all B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅, and B ⊆ Br+1(i),
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
SCUλ
λCr
S
(i), B
λCr
S
(i),Br(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B)
⇒
∑
B∈Br,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
∑
B∈Br,
B∩S 6=∅
λCr
S
(i), B
λCr
S
(i),Br(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(20)
E
∆v(S)
⇒
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
ℓ=r
λCℓ
S
(i),Bℓ(i)∆v(S). (21)
By SCUλ and (21), we have for all B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅, and B ⊆ Br+1(i) with∏h
ℓ=r λCℓS(i),Bℓ(B) = 0,
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) = 0 =
h∏
ℓ=r
λCℓ
S
(i),Bℓ(B)∆v(S). (22)
Induction step: Assume that (21) and (22) hold to ϕ with an arbitrarym−1, 0 ≤ m−1 ≤
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h− 1 (IH). It follows for all i ∈ S with
∏h
ℓ=r λCℓS(i),Bℓ(i) > 0,∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
SCUλ
∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
λCr
S
(i), B
λCr
S
(i),Br(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B)
=
(20)
(IH)
h∏
ℓ=r+1
λCℓ
S
(i),Bℓ(i)∆v(S)
⇒
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
ℓ=r
λCℓ
S
(i),Bℓ(i)∆v(S).
Analogously, for all B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅, with
∏h
ℓ=r λCℓS(i),Bℓ(B) = 0, we have
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) = 0 =
h∏
ℓ=r
λCℓ
S
(i),Bℓ(B)∆v(S).
Therefore, ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
7.3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.6
Let N ∈ N dis and B ∈ LN be fixed.
⇒: By Remark 3.3 and Proposition 3.4, each ϕ ∈ HSL on (N, v, B) ∈ VLN coincides
with a Harsanyi solution φ ∈ H on (N, v) ∈ VN and satisfies LG.
⇐: Obviously, if we use the coinciding axioms for TU-values (with the exception of
LG) in Proposition 3.4, we have characterizations of Harsanyi solutions with exogenously
given sharing systems λ ∈ Λ. Note that these axiomatizations hold for all N ∈ N and,
especially, for games which are defined on the same player sets as used for induced LS-
games of the original LS-game on a fixed N ∈ N dis, B ∈ LN. Thus, each φ ∈ H satisfies the
standard axioms ETU , NTU , ATU for TU-values, and SU
λ
TU for some λ ∈ Λ. Any LS-value
ϕ that coincides with a Harsanyi solution on N ∈ N dis, B ∈ LN, must also coincide with a
Harsanyi solution in the induced LS-games. Therefore, any LS-value ϕ that coincides with
a Harsanyi solution must satisfy the simply transferred LS-versions of these axioms: E, N,
A, and SSUλ
′
for some λ′ ∈ Λdis and also in corresponding induced LS-games. Note that
SSUλ
′
is implied by SUλ, and SCUλ is implied by SSUλ
′
and LG for some λ, λ′ ∈ Λdis for
a fixed N ∈ N dis, B ∈ LN. Thus, all the axioms of Proposition 3.5 must be satisfied and we
have ϕ ∈ HSL.
7.3.4 Proof of Corollary 3.7
The claim follows immediately due to the axiomatization of the Harsanyi set (Vasil’ev,
1981) by the TU-versions of E, N, Pos, and A and Theorem 3.6.
7.3.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W dis, and KwB,T be the expressions
according to Def. 4.1.
• E, N, A, LG: The claim follows directly by Remark 4.3 and Proposition 3.4.
• SMon: The claim follows immediately by (14).
• Depw: Let k, ℓ ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(ℓ) ⊆ Br+1(k) and Br(k),Br(ℓ) be dependent in
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(Br, vr) ∈ VB
r
. If r = 0, then k, ℓ are dependent in (N, v) ∈ VN and we get
ShwSLk (N, v,B)
w{k}
=
(14)
∑
T⊆N,T∋k
KwB,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T ) =
(3)
∑
T⊆N, {k,ℓ}⊆T
KwB,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T )
=
Def.
4.1
∑
T⊆N, {k,ℓ}⊆T
KwB,T (ℓ)
w{ℓ}
∆v(T ) =
ShwSLℓ (N, v,B)
w{ℓ}
.
Thus, we have also in the rth LS-game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
ShwSLBr(k)(B
r, vr,Br)
wBr(k)
=
ShwSLBr(ℓ)(B
r, vr,Br)
wBr(ℓ)
and the claim follows by LG.
• MDep: The claim follows immediately by Depw.
Convention 7.5. In order to avoid cumbersome case distinctions in the proof of Propo-
sition 4.5, if we consider only one single component isolated as a player, we define the
component dependent on itself. Then Depw is trivially satisfied.
7.3.6 Proof of Proposition 4.5
Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W dis, S ∈ ΩN, and ϕ be an LS-
value that satisfies all axioms of Theorem 4.5. Due to Proposition 4.4, (2), and A, it is
sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
By Lemma 7.3, for each level r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, exists exactly one coalition T rS with associated
T rS ⊆ B
r, which is the smallest coalition of all Rr, Rr ⊇ S, with associated Rr⊆ Br and so
in each game
(
Br, vrS,B
r
)
∈ VLB
r
, we have ∆vr
S
(T rS ) = ∆v(S) and ∆vrS(R
r) = 0 for Rr ⊆
Br, Rr 6= T rS . Therefore, by (3), possibly using Conv. 7.5, all components B ∈ B
r, B∩S 6= ∅,
are dependent in (Br, vrS). If B ∈ B
r, B ∩ S = ∅, we have, by N,
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, vS,B) = 0.
We use induction on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h, for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h− r.
Initialization: Let m = 0 and so r = h. For an arbitrary i ∈ S, we get∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
Depw
∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
wB
wBh(i)
∑
j∈Bh(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
E
∆v(S)
⇒
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
∆v(S). (23)
Induction step: Assume that (23) holds to ϕ with an arbitrary m− 1, 0 ≤ m− 1 ≤ h− 1
(IH). It follows, for an arbitrary i ∈ S,∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
Depw
∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
wB
wBr(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B)
=
(IH)
h∏
k=h−m+1
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
∆v(S)
⇒
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
∆v(S).
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Therefore, ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
7.3.7 Proof of Theorem 4.6
By Proposition 4.4, we only have to show the way back.
Let N ∈ N dis, (N, v,B) ∈ VLN,B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and ϕ be an LS-value that satisfies
E, N, SMon, A, and MDep. By SMon and N, we have ϕi(N, uN ,B) > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Take a w ∈ W dis such that wB :=
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, uN ,B) for all B ∈ B. By MDep, we have
for all Bk, Bℓ ∈ B
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that Bℓ ⊆ B
r+1(Bk), and Bk, Bℓ are dependent in
(Br, vr) ∈ VB
r
, ∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈Bℓ
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBℓ
and Depw is satisfied. The claim follows by Proposition 4.5.
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